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Abstract
Building on the seminal work of Veronesi (2000), we investigate
the relationship between the quality of information on the state of
the economy and equity risk premium. In this, we use a setup where
investors have Epstein-Zin preferences and the economy switches be-
tween booms and recessions at random intervals (Hamilton, 1989).
Calibrating the model to ﬁt the business cycle patterns in the US
postwar data, we are able to establish two key results: First, as con-
jectured in the existing literature, we demonstrate that investors with
high intertemporal elasticity of substitution will require lower excess
returns for holding stocks if they are provided with better information
on the state of the economy. Second, and even more interesting (since
not predicted in the literature), we ﬁnd that this will also hold for
investors with a moderate elasticity of intertemporal substitution if
they are moderately risk averse.
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11 Introduction
One of the key challenges for investors in modern ﬁnancial markets is to
convert the ﬂood of news they are constantly facing into updated projections
on the state of the economy. Obviously, publicly available signals might
contain more or less information on the underlying state of the economy.
High quality signals will enable investors to make high quality forecasts on
the state of the economy, so it is natural to expect risk premia to vary with
the amount of information they contain.
In a seminal contribution, Veronesi (2000) studies the link between infor-
mation quality and risk premia within the framework of an exchange economy
populated by a continuum of agents with identical power utility preferences.
He ﬁnds several intriguing and quite surprising relationships between signals
and stock returns, including: (i) the risk premium is increasing in the amount
of information contained in the signals and (ii) unless the signals contain com-
plete information on the state of the economy, the equity is bounded above
independently of investors’ risk aversion. The second result has the strong
theoretical implication that, even assuming extremely risk averse investors,
the model would not be capable of replicating the empirically observed risk
premium. The ﬁrst result is maybe even more intriguing, since it is so much
at odds with what economic intuition tells us.
In this article, we revisit the relation between information quality and
stock returns by introducing Epstein-Zin’s preferences to Veronesi’s model.
As we will show, both results are overturned for a resonable calibration.
While there is a large literature exploring the asset-pricing implications
of alternative preference speciﬁcations, we are not aware of anyone address-
ing speciﬁcally the topic of information quality. One particularly prominent
line of research looks at the asset-pricing implications of including habits in
the utility function (see e.g. Constantinides, 1990; Abel, 1990; Gali, 1994;
Jermann, 1998, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; and Boldrin et al., 2001.)
Another line of research, started by Epstein and Zin (1989), Epstein and Zin
(1991), and Weil (1989), looks at generalizations of the power utility func-
tion that allows us to relax the link between risk aversion and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. This type of utility function, referred to as
Epstein-Zin preferences, is particularly well-suited for our purposes. First,
this type of utility function has been underlying much of the important re-
cent research in asset-pricing (see e.g. Campbell and Viceira, 2001; Campbell
et al., 2003; Bansal et al., 2002; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Guvenen, 2005; and
2many others), including some featuring the same kind of Bayesian learning
we are assuming (Brandt et al., 2004 and Lettau et al., 2004). Second, since
Epstein-Zin preferences nest the power utility function as a special case, we
are able to build on Veronesi’s work and provide a direct comparison with
his results.
The main ﬁnding of our paper is that for a wide range of plausible pa-
rameterizations of the utility function, the required risk premium on equity
is decreasing in the quality of information available to investors. This range
covers both a domain where this reversal has been predicted in the literature
(ψ > 1), as well as a domain where it comes as a completely new result
(ψ < 1). Both sides are important, since there is a considerable controversy
with respect to the appropriate parameter value for the EIS parameter.1
Grasping the mechanisms that govern the relation between information qual-
ity and equity returns is far from trivial. On a technical level, it is related
to how stock prices move with the state of the economy. We show that the
premium, equities command over risk-free bonds, depends on: 1) the vari-
ance of consumption, 2) the volatility of equity prices and 3) the covariance
of returns with consumption growth rates.2 There is no link between infor-
mation quality and variance of consumption growth rates, so we will focus
on the last two factors. Furthermore, we will generally focus on the case of
investors with an higher RA parameter relative to their EIS. (Or a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty, in the language of Kocherlakota, 1990.)
As to the second factor, the variance of returns is increasing in the signal
quality. Assuming a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, higher
variance translates into a higher required equity premium if investors have
a high EIS (> 1) and a lower required equity premium if investors have a
1The empirical estimates vary strongly with the assumptions made on the structure
of the economy. One strand of empirical research uses representative agent setup and
estimates the EIS parameter using aggregate consumption data. This approach typically
leads to estimated EIS coeﬃcients in the range of 0-0.3 (see e.g. Hall, 1988; Campbell
and Mankiw, 1989, 1991; Hahm, 1998; Campbell, 2003; and Yogo, 2004). Another strand
of research seeks to avoid potential biases, introduced using aggregate data, relying on
microeconomic survey data. For stockholders, these studies ﬁnd EIS parameters around
or above 1. (See Beaudry and van Wincoop, 1996; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Vissing-
Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003; and Guvenen, 2005). Recent asset-pricing literature relies
on the high EIS estimates of the latter literature (e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004 or Lettau
et al., 2004 both calibrate their models with an EIS greater than one.)
2See also equation (8.3.7) on page 320 of Campbell et al. (1997).
3moderate EIS (< 1). As we argue below, the market price of equity is a
projection of the true underlying value of equity. If investors can only access
low quality information on the state of the economy, their estimate of the
underlying value will not change much over time, and the volatility of prices
will be low. By providing investors with better information, we enable them
to better estimate the underlying value. This will increase the volatility of
prices because changes in the underlying value of equity will translate directly
into changes in its projected value.
As to the third factor, the covariance of consumption and returns turns
out to be decreasing (in absolute terms) in the quality of information available
to investors. For the parameterizations we focus on, this characteristic trans-
lates into a lower required equity premium. The ﬁnding that the covariance
is decreasing in the signal quality is somewhat surprising at the ﬁrst glance.
Better information on the state of the world will enable investors to better
identify the state of the economy, making prices more cyclical. However,
the stronger cyclicality does not translate into a higher covariance of eq-
uity returns with consumption. The intuition is that without an informative
external signal, prices will only move with the information available in real-
ized consumption growth rates. This leads to a relatively high covariance.
If investors can access informative external signals, the tight link between
agents’ beliefs and consumption growth rates is relaxed. This will reduce
the comovement of consumption and returns. Because better information
quality will generally bring the covariance down, the impact of information
quality on the required risk premium will depend on whether the covariance
is positive or negative in the ﬁrst place. In one way an EIS of 1 constitutes
a watershed with procyclical prices for higher EIS and countercyclical prices
for lower EIS.3 However, for the parameter conﬁgurations we consider, the
coeﬃcient on the covariance term also changes sign depending on whether
the investors have an EIS greater or smaller than 1. Summarizing, the inﬂu-
ence of better information quality on the covariance term will be such that
it reduces the required risk premium.
The impact of increased information quality on the required excess return
to equity is found by adding up the impact on the variance and the covariance
term. For the parameters range that we deem most relevant:
• if investors have an EIS moderately smaller than 1, then both terms
change in such a way that the equity premium decreases;
3Bansal and Yaron (2004) demonstrate an analogous result within a log-linear model.
4• if investors have an EIS > 1, then the increased variance of returns due
to better information quality will push the required equity premium
up, while the reduced covariance between returns and consumption
innovations will push it down. Our numerical results show that the
second eﬀect dominates.
Hence, both for EIS < 1 and EIS > 1, we obtain the intuitive result that the
equity premium is decreasing in the signal quality.
The implied cyclicality of equity prices provides a metric for comparing the
empirical relevance of various parameterizations. A well known feature of the
power utility function is that it imposes the restriction that the EIS parame-
ter equals the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ. Eﬀectively,
since asset-pricing models are almost exclusively parametrized with a γ larger
than one, it would predict countercyclical equity prices within our setting.
This is not true with Epstein-Zin preferences, where a RA parameter larger
than 1 does not impose an EIS parameter less than 1. We show that em-
pirical equity prices are strongly procyclical, lending strong support to the
assumption that investors have a high EIS.
Another important ﬁnding is that there is no global maximum for the re-
quired equity as a function of the RA of investors. This is diﬀerent from
what obtains in a regime-switching economy where investors are power util-
ity maximizers (Veronesi, 2000, proposition 3b). Unless the EIS parameter is
very low, increasing investors’ risk aversion leads monotonously to a higher
required equity premium. The key intuition behind this result is that the
cyclicality of returns is mainly governed by investors’ EIS. Under power util-
ity, increasing investors RA automatically decreases their EIS, making prices
and hence returns increasingly countercyclical. For high levels of RA, re-
turns actually become countercyclical, making equity a good hedge against
consumption risk. Thus investors are willing to accept expected returns lower
than the risk-free rate to hold it. With Epstein-Zin preferences, investors’
RA is uncoupled from their EIS. Hence we can generate as high a procycli-
cality of equity prices as we like by increasing ψ and, at the same time, make
the investors as averse to procyclical payoﬀs as we want by increasing γ.
While we diﬀer from Veronesi in the choice of preferences, we remain
close to his model in terms of the dynamics of our model economy. We
assume that the underlying state of the economy follows an ergodic, two-state
5Markov switching process. The state of the economy is a hidden variable,
so investors have to rely on the information embedded in dividend growth
rates and other signals for pricing equity and bonds. Since this type of model
is able to capture non-linearities found in the data that are missed by more
traditional models (see discussion in Hamilton, 2005), it has been widely used
in economics since its introduction by Hamilton (1989).4
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the general model
and the properties of the external signal, Section 3 discusses the cyclical
properties found in the postwar US time series, and Section 4 presents for-
mulae for equity prices, returns and the risk-free rate. A numerical analysis is
provided in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. Proofs, algebraic derivations,
and additional results are provided in Appendix A.
2 Model
We assume a Lucas (1978) type exchange economy, populated by a continuum














where κ ≡ (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/ψ) and γ > 0.
The parameter γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, while the EIS
is given by ψ. The function reduces to a monotone transformation of the
standard power utility function for ψ = γ−1. Dividends (the endowment
good) grow according to the process
Ct = Ct−1e
 c,i+σc,iǫc,t, (2)
4In particular, in the asset-pricing literature, the implications of a Markov switching
process in the conditional mean of the endowment process are analyzed by Cecchetti et al.
(1990); Kandel and Stambaugh (1991); Cecchetti et al. (1993); Abel (1994); Abel (1999).
Time series behavior of the second moments are recently studied in a regime switching
framework: by setting up an equilibrium economy where the endowment process follows
a latent two state regime switching process, Veronesi (1999) shows a better explanatory
power of volatility clustering than a model without regimes. In the same setting, Whitelaw
(2000) introduces time-varying transition probabilities between regimes, ﬁnding a complex
nonlinear relation between expected returns and stock market volatility. A recent contribu-
tion that studies the impact of regime switches in the volatility of the endowment process
is in Lettau et al. (2004).
6where  c,i and σc,i denote the mean log consumption growth rate in state i,
and its standard deviation, respectively, and ǫt is an i.i.d. standard normal
variable.
The underlying state of the economy st follows an ergodic, two-state
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(1 − θ1) θ2
 
(3)
where θi > 0.5. For identiﬁcation, we assume  c,1 >  c,2, so that the ﬁrst
state has the natural interpretation of a boom state, while the second state
is a recession state.
The state of the economy is not directly observable, but agents have
various sources of information at hand for inferring it. The most obvious
such source is the growth rate of dividends themselves. Given the structure
of the economy, which is assumed known to the agents, high growth rates
will indicate a high probability of being in the boom state, while the reverse
is true for low growth rates.
All information in addition to that contained in dividend growth rates,
is aggregated as an independent noisy signal. For convenience, we let this
signal take the form
yt = 1{st=1} y,1(h) + ǫy,t, (4)
where ǫy,t is an i.i.d. white noise term, and 1{st=1} is an indicator function
which equals one if we are in the second state and zero otherwise. The
strength of the signal is determined by h ∈ [0,1]. An h of zero implies that
the signal contains no information, while an h of one implies that the signal
is strong enough to reveal the state of the economy with certainty.
In the case where the external signal is almost pure noise, the probability
of assigning a lower posterior probability to the true state based on only
one realization of the signal (i.e. of making a type I error) is 50 %. For
intermediate levels of signal quality, we let h be the percentage reduction in
this probability relative to the pure noise case.
Figure 1 illustrates this: Based on a single observation, a higher probabil-
ity is assigned to the state where the denisity is highest for that observation.
Thus, the probability of a type one error is given by the area of the shaded
7Figure 1: Signal precision and state densities
Plotted are the densities of the signal in the two states when the signal has
strength h = 0.9.








Boom signal density (h = 0.9) Recession signal density
region. It probability converges to 0.5 as the means of the two distributions
converge.
Normalizing the mean of the signal in the recession state to 0, and as-
suming without loss of generality that the signal has a positive mean in the
boom state, the mean that generates a h percent reduction of the probability
of making a type I error is given by







where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal.
To see this, note that F −1((1 − h)/2) gives the point diametrically opposite
to the intersection of the two densities in Figure 1 and that the mean signal
in the boom state is twice as far from zero as the point of intersection.
Figure 2 illustrates how the information embedded in dividend growth
rates is combined with that of the external signal to infer state probabilities.
The ﬁgure is created by generating a series of states, growth rates, and signals
using the estimated process parameters from the next section. Realizations
of the low growth state are marked as shaded areas. Given an intial draw
8Figure 2: Simulated signals and inferred probabilities
Plotted are simulated consumption and signal series for a Markov-switching
economy, given estimated process parameters from section 3 and a signal
strength of h = 0.85. The solid line in the lower panel are inferred state
probabilities given both the consumption and external signal; the dashed
line those given only by the consumption signal (with h = 0, the external
signal is pure noise and investors give it no weight.)
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9of states, dividend growth rates (top panel) and signals (mid panel) were
generated. Applying Hamilton’s 1989 ﬁlter to the realized dividend growth
rates only produces the dashed line in the bottom panel. By passing also the
external signal through the ﬁlter, investors are able to establish with much
larger certainty the current state of the economy, as illustrated by the solid
line in the bottom panel.
3 Data, estimation, and calibration
The sample period chosen for calibrating the model, spans from the ﬁrst
quarter of 1952 to the last quarter of 2003. The data-set is expressed in real
terms with a quarterly frequency. Prices and dividends are on the S&P 500
composite, while the risk-free rate is the yield on 1 year treasury bills, all
downloaded from Robert J. Shiller’s webpage.5 Consumption is quarterly
real total personal consumption expenditures (NIPA table 2.3.6, line 1) and
GDP is quarterly real Gross Domestic Income (NIPA table 1.1.6, line 1),
both downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website.6 Finally,
we use the oﬃcial recession dates as reported on the website of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.7
Our data-set is a standard one and descriptive statistics are similar to
those reported elsewhere in the literature. The average return on equity is
8.8% on an annual basis with a standard deviation of 16.1%. Compared with
the mean risk-free rate of 1.8%, this yields an equity premium around 7.0%.
As to macroeconomic variables, GDP grew during the postwar sample at a
mean annual rate of 2.2%, while the consumption had an annual growth rate
of 2.3%. These numbers are summarized Table 1.
Financial market lore contends that prices move procyclically with the
business cycle. To verify this conjecture, we calculate the correlation matrix
amongst the cyclical components of the US economic and ﬁnancial series. For
this, all series were expressed in real terms, logged, and then ﬁltered with
the HP-ﬁlter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). As it is shown in Table 2, the
cyclical compentents of all the series are strongly positively correlated, with a
correlation coeﬃcient ranging from 0.40 for GDP and the price-dividend ratio




10Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table summarizes empirical means and standard deviations in the US
postwar data. (Q1:1952–Q4:2003; sources: BEA and Robert Shiller’s web-
page.)
Equity Risk-free GDP Consumption
return rate growth growth
Mean 0.088 0.018 0.022 0.023
Std. deviation 0.161 0.030 0.020 0.017
Table 2: Cyclical correlations
This table reports the correlation matrix for the cyclical component of main
US ﬁnancial and economic series. (Q1:1952–Q4:2003; sources: BEA and
Robert Shiller’s webpage.)
S&P 500 PD ratio GDP Consumption
S&P 500 1.000
PD ratio 0.965 1.000
GDP 0.487 0.397 1.000
Consumption 0.545 0.469 0.877 1.000
is the correlation between the cyclical component of GDP and stock prices.
The scatter plot in Figure 3 illustrates this for the cyclical components of
GDP and the price-dividend ratio. From table 2, we see that the slope of the
regression line (i.e. the correlation coeﬃcient) is close to 0.5.
Parameter estimates for the regime switching model was found by using
a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) procedure on the total consumption
series. In this, we closely followed the algorithm described in section 9.1 of
Kim and Nelson (1999). The resulting estimates are given in Table 3.
Some preliminary intuition on the model economy can be inferred from
the regime switching estimation: from the perspective of a risk averse agent,
the boom state is preferable to the recession state because of the higher mean
growth rates. A crucial variable for our analysis is the high persistence of
both states, especially the boom state. The probabilities of switching from
11Figure 3: Correlation between detrended stock prices and GDP
This ﬁgure plots the cyclical component of real GDP versus the cyclical
component of real stock prices, both estimated with the HP-ﬁlter.






















Table 3: Estimated regime parameters
Reported are the estimated parameters of the regime switching model for
the US postwar data. (Q1:1952–Q4:2003; source: BEA)
State  c(s) σc(s) θij
Boom (s=b) 0.0080 0.0061 0.0586
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0262)
Recession (s=r) -0.0018 0.0061 0.1809
(0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0704)
the two states are 5.86% and 18.09%, respectively. These probabilities imply
an average duration of 17.1 quarters for booms and 5.5 quarters for recessions.
Hence, if we ﬁnd ourselves in either of the two states, we expect to stay in
it for several periods, leading to a higher expected utility in the boom state
than in the recession state.
The regime switching characteristics of the consumption series is assessed
using the test by Carrasco et al. (2005), following the approach proposed by
12Figure 4: Model recession probabilities
Plotted are our estimated posterior probabilities of being in a recession cou-
pled with the oﬃcial NBER recession dates (shaded areas).







Hamilton (2005). Results are comforting, with a probability value of 2.5%
for Markov switching. This lends support to modeling the data according to
Equation (2).8
For the analysis of the model’s properties, we calibrate the utility function
with parameters in line with those used in leading asset-pricing models. In
particular, we use the parametrization of Lettau et al. (2004) as a benchmark
and set γ = 25, ψ = 1.5, and β = 0.9925.
8In order to test whether some autocorrelation in the data could lead to not rejecting
the regime switching speciﬁcation, we also test our speciﬁcation against a ﬁrst order au-
toregressive process. The obtained probability value of 19% does not allow us to reject
the AR(1) speciﬁcation at conventional levels, but is still in line with our regime switching
speciﬁcation.
134 Prices and returns
In this section we introduce the equilibrium price-dividend ratio formula for
the stock market and the relevant rate of returns in the model economy.
One of the key results of Epstein and Zin (1989) is that the stochas-











where Re,t+1 is the equilibrium gross return to aggregate wealth between t
and t+1. Using this result, we can ﬁnd expressions for the equity premium,
as well as the one period risk-free rate. As usual, the gross risk-free rate is














Thus, in this setting, the interest rate will ﬂuctuate not only with the ex-
pected growth rate of consumption, but also with the expected changes in
the price-consumption ratio.
Proposition 4.1. Given a boom probability of ξt|t, the price-consumption
ratio is given by
wt = [ξt|tw
κ





where wb and wr denote the price-consumption ratio when the investors know,


















Proof. see Appendix A.
Since we are in an endowment economy, equilibrium conditions require
that consumption is always equal to dividends so the price-dividend ratio is
also given by Proposition 4.1. We will use the two terms interchangeably.
14It is easy to verify that the price-consumption formula is strictly convex in
the state probability if κ < 1, and strictly concave if κ > 1. Hence, for κ < 1,
as it is in our calibration, the average price-dividend ratio under uncertainty
is lower than the linear combination of the certainty price-dividend ratios
weighted by the state beliefs. This non-linearity rules out the typical, linear-
algebra closed form solutions, that we obtain under power utility. To solve
for the state prices wj, we relied on numerical integration using a Gauss-
Hermite Quadrature. By using a large number of nodes, we assured that our
prices are arbitrarily close to the true values. (See e.g. Judd, 1998, chapter
7). We tested our solution algorithm against the closed form solutions for
the power-utility case. The diﬀerences we found were only a few orders of
magnitude away from the machine’s precision.
One key concern is to determine whether prices are moving pro or counter-
cyclically with the state of the economy. We restrict our attention to the
relevant case where the probability of the economy remaining in the same
state, on a period-on-period basis, is higher than the probability that we
have a regime switch. In the degenerate case where θ1 = θ2 = 0.5, the
information that the current state of the economy contains is irrelevant for
forming expectations about future payoﬀs, and the price-dividend ratio will
not move with the state probabilities.
As we show in the Appendix, decreasing the transition probability in
each state will increase the extent to which variations in expected discounted
payoﬀs over the two states translate into variations in state prices. Fur-
thermore, we use this result to show that procyclical prices follow whenever
the EIS parameter ψ is greater than 1. This is established in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.2. For θ1 and θ2 greater than 1
2, when ψ > 1 (ψ < 1) the
price-dividend ratio is higher (lower) in booms than in recessions.
Proof. see Appendix A.
The intuition behind this ﬁnding is that variations in the expected growth
rate of dividends not only inﬂuence expected payoﬀs, but also the rate at
which they are discounted. We can better understand this by log-linearizing
the Euler equation for equity, and solving it for expected returns. This gives
us
























15The main diﬀerence between booms and recessions is that the expected
growth rate of dividends is higher in booms than in recessions, so that the
second term of the equation will be higher in booms. On the one hand, an
upward revision of the expected growth rate of dividends increases the ex-
pected payoﬀs of equity, increasing its value to investors. On the other hand,
investors prefer consumption proﬁles which are smooth over time. Given an
upward revision in the expected dividend growth rate, investors would like
to smooth their intertemporal consumption proﬁle by shifting consumption
from the future to the present. Since the model does not allow for any aggre-
gate saving or dissaving, an equilibrium can only be obtained if the expected
return on all assets increase enough check investors’ desire to sell them oﬀ
in order to ﬁnance consumption increases. The amount expected returns
will have to increase to maintain an equilibrium depends on how tolerant
investors are to consumption variations over time (i.e. on their elasticity of
intertemporal substitution). If ψ < 1, an upward adjustment of the expected
dividend growth rate causes an even larger upward adjustment of the re-
quired return to equity. This leads to a drop in prices. If ψ > 1, an upward
adjustment of expected consumption growth rates is matched by less than a
one-to-one adjustment of the required return to equity; hence prices would
be increasing in the boom probability. Because Equation (9) does not hold
strictly for our non-linear economy, we have also included a (tedious) proof
in the Appendix that does not rely on loglinearization.
The key relation we need to analyze in our model, is the one between
unconditional equity premium and diﬀerent signal quality. The following
proposition provides an approximate analytical expression for assessing this
relation.9
Proposition 4.3. If consumption and asset returns are homoskedastic and
jointly lognormal, the equity premium can be expressed as
EP = γσ
2
c + (1 − κ)σ
2
ω + ((1 − κ) + γ)σω,c (10)
where σ2
c is the variance of the log consumption growth, σ2
ω is the variance of
log
1+wt+1
wt , and σω,c is their covariance.
Proof. see Appendix A.
9Is worth noting that the quantitative results in the next section do not rely on this
linear approximation, but on precise numerical algorithms.
16The ﬁrst part of the equation, γσ2
c, is the familiar textbook formula for the
equity premium. There is no link between the quality of the signal and the
volatility of consumption, so we can safely ignore this term for our purposes.
Turning to the second term of the equation, we know that with perfect signals
prices will move in step with the state of the economy, entailing a relatively
large jump whenever it switches from one state to the another. By analogy to
Shiller (1981), this implies that the price volatility is increasing in the signal
quality. The price-dividend ratio is a forecast of the true value of equity
given knowledge on the state of the economy. Denoting this value by w⋆
t, we
can use standard regression theory to express w⋆
t as the sum of forecast and
an orthogonal forecasting error term ut:
w
⋆
t = wt + ut.
Since ut is orthogonal to wt, we can rely on the basic statistics rule that
the variance of the sum of two uncorrelated variables equals the sum of their
variances. It follows that var(wt) = var(w⋆
t)−var(ut). Since variances cannot
be negative, the variance of the price-dividend ratio must be lower than the
one of the underlying value. The expected eﬀect of better information quality
is to bring the price-dividend ratio toward w⋆
t. This reduces the variance of ut
and increases that of wt. The variance of wt reaches its upper bound var(w⋆
t)
when the signal is strong enough to pin down the state of the economy with
certainty.
Regarding the last term of Equation (10), it follows from Proposition 4.2
that the covariance of prices with consumption will be positive whenever ψ
is greater than one, and negative otherwise. Moreover, increasing the sig-
nal quality pushes the covariance toward zero in both the power utility and
Epstein and Zin speciﬁcation. The intuition is that, without an informative
external signal, prices will only move with the information available in real-
ized consumption growth rates. This leads to a relatively high covariance.
If investors can access informative external signals, the tight link between
agents’ beliefs and consumption growth rates is relaxed. This will dampen
the covariance. Because better information quality will generally bring the
covariance down, the impact of information quality on the required risk pre-
mium will depend on whether the covariance is positive or negative in the
ﬁrst place. In order to verify this claim, we performed a Monte Carlo analy-
sis on the model economy by simulating prices and consumption growth for
10000 periods for various signal strengths. Results are just as expected and
17Figure 5: Signal quality and second moments
Plotted are the predicted variance of ex cum-dividend equity returns σ2
ω
and their predicted covariance with consumption growth rates σω,c for two

































































are displayed in Figure 5.
Given the above analysis, we can now disentangle the movements in the
equity premium with respect to variations in the signal quality. Taking the
18derivative of equation (10) with respect to signal quality yields
dEP
dh
= (1 − κ)
dσ2
ω
dh     
>0
+((1 − κ) + γ)
dσω,c




In the power utility case, Equation (11) simpliﬁes to γ
dσω,c
dh . Consequently,
the inﬂuence of the signal quality is entering only through the covariance
between consumption and price innovations. Both of Veronesi’s key results
follow directly: First, if γ > 1, then ψ, which is its inverse under power
utility, must be smaller than one; thus, the better the signal quality, the
higher the risk premium will be. Second, the bound on the risk premium
follows from how the shape of the price function changes as we increase γ.









In the immediate proximity of γ = 1, both the covariance term and its
derivative with respect to γ are zero.10 Accordingly, increasing γ will lead to
an increase in the required equity premium. As we let γ approach inﬁnity,
the two last terms become more and more negative. At some point, the
whole right hand side becomes negative and increasing γ beyond this point
decreases the equity premium. If we increase γ enough, we will enter a
domain where the equity premium turns negative. As we show in the next
section, even moderate values for γ lead us into this domain.
In the Epstein and Zin case things are more complicated. All the terms in
Equation (11) are fully contributing to the equity premium. Moreover, their
direction of inﬂuence depends on how the utility function is parameterized.
10In the power utility case, it follows from the Euler equation that









Hence dwb/dγ = −wb. Analogously, dwr/dγ = −wr. The derivative of the spread between
boom and recession prices is given by d(wb −wr)/dγ = wr −wb. Since wb = wr for γ = 1,
an incremental increase of γ, from γ = 1, does not entail any increase in σω from its value
of 0. For the same reason
σw,c
dγ




19Table 4: Summary table
This table summarizes the relation between information quality and the terms governing the equity premium. Columns in
bold typeface cover main scenarios in our analysis.
0 < ψ < 0.5 0.5 < ψ < 1 1 < ψ
γ ∈ (0, 1
ψ) γ > 1
ψ γ ∈ (0, 1




2ψ−1 γ ∈ (0, 1














dh + − + − − − − +
(1 − κ) + γ + + + + − − + +
dσω,c
dh + + + + + − − −
((1 − κ) + γ)
dσω,c
dh + + + + − + − −
EP + ? + ? − ? − ?
2
0Table 4 gives a breakdown of the analytical implications of Equation (11) for
diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. Notice that for certain conﬁgurations, we
cannot determine unambiguously the eﬀect of improved signal quality based
on this expression alone. For such cases, we rely on numerical results.
We focus on the scenario where investors have a high risk aversion relative
to their elasticity of intertemporal substitution.11 Consider ﬁrst the case
ψ > 1 and γ > 1. This covers our baseline calibration and, as we argue
above, is the most realistic case: 1) asset-pricing models are hardly ever
calibrated with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion less than one; 2) a ψ
larger than one is both necessary to replicate the procyclicality of equity
prices and concurs with recent microeconomic studies. Looking at Equation
(10), κ is negative for such a parametrization, leading the term (1− κ)σ2
ω to
be positive and increasing in the signal quality, and the term (1−κ+γ)σω,c
to be decreasing. Consequently an analysis of the relative magnitude of
the two terms is necessary. It turns out that, over a large span of possible
parameterizations, the two second moments are almost identical, while the
coeﬃcient is always higher by γ for the covariance term. Thus the inﬂuence
of the last term is stronger, and the impact of information quality on the
required return to equity will be determined by the sign of σω,c. The outcome
is that the required equity premium is decreasing in the quality of information
available on the state of the economy.
The result for ψ > 1 is important but maybe not that surprising, since
ψ > 1 is the condition for procyclical prices.12 The more surprising result
is that we obtain the same eﬀect in an even more clear cut manner for
some realistic constellations with ψ < 1. As we argue above, the variance of
returns is always increasing in the signal quality while the covariance between
returns and consumption innovations goes to zero. For ψ < 1, the covariance
term is negative, so when it goes to zero, it actually increases. This means
that both derivatives in Equation (11) are positive, and that the required
risk premium will be unambiguously decreasing in the signal quality if their
coeﬃcients are both negative. For ψ in the range 0.5 to 1.0, this will be
the case as long as investors are suﬃciently risk averse. Speciﬁcally, we need
γ > 1/(2ψ − 1). In contrast, if investors have a suﬃciently low degree of
risk aversion that γ ≤ 1/ψ (i.e. they have a preference for late resolution
11In Table 4, these columns are set oﬀ in a bold typeface.
12In fact, Veronesi had conjectured that this result in a set of lecture notes he has made
available to us.
21of uncertainty), both coeﬃcients in Equation (11) turn positive, pushing us
back to a situation where investors require higher excess returns if they can
access to better information. Notice that the power utility function forms
the borderline case where γ = 1/ψ. For intermediate levels of risk aversion,
the eﬀects of the variance and the covariance term are of opposite signs, and
the total eﬀect cannot be derived from Equation (11) alone. If γ is close to
the lower bound of this interval, the variance term will dominate; if γ is close
to the upper bound, the covariance term will dominate and the risk premium
will be decreasing in the signal quality.
If ψ < 0.5, i.e. if agents are very averse to substituting consumption
over time, there is no case where all terms of Equation (11) are negative.
However, as long as investors have a preference for early resolution, we are
in the ambiguous case where the relative sizes of the two terms determine
the total impact. For high levels of risk aversion, such as the one we use in
our baseline calibration, we maintain a negative relation between the quality
of information and required equity premium, even for very low levels of the
EIS. For example, with a γ = 25, the required equity premium is decreasing
in the signal quality even if the EIS is as low as 0.075.
5 Numerical analysis
In this section we underscore and quantify the qualitative results from Section
4. Our ﬁrst result is that less precise signals increase the equity premium and
derives directly from Proposition 4.3. Using the benchmark parametrization
described in Section 3, we use numerical integration to calculate the equity
premium with diﬀerent levels of signal quality. Figure 6 shows that the
more precise the signal, the lower the required equity premium. The relative
increase in the equity risk premium from a perfect signal (h = 1) to a signal
which is pure noise (h = 0) is signiﬁcant and equal to 11.3%. The result
concurs with the analysis on the equity premium provided in Section 4, since
both relevant parameters, γ and ψ, are greater than 1.
Using the same analysis, we can investigate the inﬂuence of the EIS on
the relation between signal quality and equity premium. Figure 7 shows
the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the EIS. The upper left
panel displays the case of a power utility investor, illustrating the monotonous
positive relation between signal quality and equity premium (i.e. better signal
quality increases the required risk premium). In the other three panels, we
22Figure 6: Baseline: signal quality and expected risk premium
Plotted is the relationship between signal quality and the implied equity
premium for our baseline calibration (γ = 25, ψ = 1.5, and β = 0.9925.)





















trace out the same relation for various EIS parameters. Clearly the relation
is not always unambiguous, even showing cases with a non linear relation
(upper right panel).
As pointed out in Proposition 4.2, an increase in the ψ parameter in-
creases the required equity premium regardless the signal quality (see the
two lower panels). Moreover, the interplay between the RA and the EIS that
determines the coeﬃcients of the relevant second moments for the equity pre-
mium, allows the model to reverse the relation between signal quality and
equity premium, even with values of ψ less than 1 (lower left panel). As
noted in the Introduction, the other key counterintuitive prediction of the
power utility setup is that, when signals are noisy, the equity premium is
bounded above in the parameter γ. Figure 8 contains a replication of Panel
B of Figure 2 from Veronesi (2000). This is the solid line, displaying a well
deﬁned global maximum. Such a maximum makes it even more diﬃcult to
solve the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985), since increas-
ing the risk aversion parameter would not do any good beyond this point.
As a means of comparison, Figure 8 also plots the equity risk premium with
Epstein-Zin preferences. In this setup, increasing the RA parameter does not
aﬀect the EIS and hence leaves the cyclicality of returns largely unaﬀected.
The result is that for most values of ψ an almost linear and increasing rela-
23Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis: variations in the EIS
This ﬁgure shows how the relation between signal quality and predicted eq-
























































tion between equity risk premium and risk aversion parameter obtains. Only
for very small values of ψ is this relation reversed. For such small values,
returns become negatively correlated with the pricing kernel. Thus, the more
risk averse investors are, the more return they are willing to give up to hold
such a claim.
A striking feature of Figure 8 is that, in general, the equity premium
is not zero even when investors have a risk aversion parameter of 0. The
exception is the curve graphing the power utility case where the required
24Figure 8: Required equity premia and risk aversion
The ﬁgure shows how the required equity premium responds to variations in
agents’ RA for diﬀerent assumptions on their EIS.




























equity premium at γ = 0 is exactly zero. Mathematically we can see that
this holds by noting that Equation (10) simpliﬁes to γ(σ2
c +σw,c). No matter
what the values of the second moments, a risk neutral agent would not require
any risk premium. Again the Epstein-Zin allows for richer dynamics. For
γ = 0, Equation (10) simpliﬁes to − 1
ψ−1(σ2
w + σw,c). Thus, if ψ is greater
than one, the required equity premium will be negative.
It is somewhat puzzling that risk neutral investors should require a pre-
mium (or be willing to pay a discount) to hold equity. Again, this has to do
with the peculiarities of the Epstein-Zin preferences. The pricing kernel of a
power utility maximizer reduces to a constant if he is risk neutral. In con-
trast, the pricing kernel of an investor with Epstein-Zin preferences is given
by βψ/(1−ψ)((1 + wt+1)/wt)1/(ψ−1), which will ﬂuctuate with the state of the
economy. It is straightforward to show that this expression is always pro-
cyclical.13 Equity will command a premium if its returns are concentrated
in periods where the kernel is low; or, in this situation, if its returns are
countercyclical. Factorizing the gross return to equity into the gross divi-
dend growth rate, ct+1/ct, and the gross return to equity net of dividends,
13For ψ < 1, ((1+wt+1)/wt) is countercyclical, but the exponential 1/(ψ−1) is negative,
so the whole expression becomes procyclical; for ψ > 1, both terms are of opposite sign,
again making the whole expression procyclical.
25Table 5: Equity premium with E-Z Preferences
This table reports the unconditional risk premium calculated for a range of
RA (γ) and EIS (ψ) parameters. (The discount factor is ﬁxed at 0.9925 and
the signal quality is kept at a completely noisy value.)
ψ
γ 0.75 1.20 1.75 2.50 3.00
0.50 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
2.00 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
4.00 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14
10.00 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.36
25.00 0.51 0.69 0.79 0.86 0.89
50.00 — — 1.58 1.70 1.75
75.00 — — — 2.50 2.57
100.00 — — — — 3.30
((1+wt+1)/wt), we know that the former will always be procyclical, while the
cyclicality of the latter will depend on the EIS parameter. For returns to be
countercyclical, we need prices to be suﬃciently countercyclical to compen-
sate the procyclicality of dividends. This requires a ψ which is substantially
below 1. Given the moments in our consumption data, and our calibrated
value for the time discount factor, we ﬁnd a threshold value of around 0.42.
Risk neutral investors with a lower EIS will require a positive premium to
hold equity; risk neutral investors with a higher EIS will be willing to accept
an expected return to equity which is lower than the risk-free rate.
Finally, we calculate equity premia for diﬀerent parameterizations of the
Epstein-Zin utility function. Table 5 illustrates how variations in investors’
RA and EIS result in variations in the predicted equity premia. It clearly dis-
plays an increasing relation between γ and the unconditional risk premium.
As argued above, an increase of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
increase the unconditional risk premium by making returns more procyclical.
266 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the implications of changes in the quality of informa-
tion on asset prices in a pure exchange economy. Matching empirical ﬁgures
with model predictions in such a setting has been a challenging aim since
the seminal contribution of Mehra and Prescott (1985). When variations in
information quality are introduced, the model predictions become even more
puzzling. Veronesi (2000) has shown that if investors investors maximize a
power utility function, the required risk premium is increasing in the quality
of information. He also shows that, in this case, there is a strict and small
upper bound for the attainable equity premium.
By allowing agents to have a general recursive utility function, we show
cases where the relation between information quality and required equity
premia is reversed with respect to previous literature, even with moderate
values of elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e. ψ < 1). Using a realistic
parametrization of the model economy, we obtain an equity premium which
is decreasing in the quality of information and has no local maximum on the
equity premium itself.
When the EIS is less than one, the interplay between the utility’s param-
eters is switching signs of the relevant second moments, allowing the model
to predict an equity premium which is decreasing in the signal quality. When
the EIS is greater than one, the results are mainly driven by the capability
of the model to replicate the procyclicality of prices over the business cycles.
The degree to which this procyclicality translates into a positive covariance
between consumption and returns, and hence high risk premia, depends on
the quality of the signals available to investors. The better the external infor-
mation available, the less prices will be driven by the information embedded
in consumption growth rates, and the smaller the covariance will be.
27A Proofs and derivations
Proof of proposition 4.1. Using the expression for the stochastic discount fac-
tor given by Equation ((6)), it follows that the Euler equation for the claim















Substituting for Rc,t+1 in Equation ((13)) using the deﬁnition Rc,t+1 ≡ (ct+1+
ct+1wt+1)/(ctwt), and multiplying both sides of the equation by wκ
t (which is
















From the deﬁnition of κ, it follows that the exponential term on consumption

































































































































the proposition follows directly.
29Proof of proposition 4.2. We start from the simpliﬁed case of θ1 = θ2 = 1
2.
The price-dividend ratio in states 1 and 2, denoted by w1 = w2 + ∆w and
w2, respectively, are given as by the following system of implicit functions:
F1 =(w2 + ∆w)
κ − θ1(w2 + ∆w + 1)
κE1 − (1 − θ1)(w2 + 1)
κE2 = 0
F2 =(w2)
κ − (1 − θ2)(w2 + ∆w + 1)
































−(w2 + ∆w + 1)κE1 + (w2 + 1)κE2 0
0 +(w2 + ∆w + 1)κE1 − (w2 + 1)κE2
 




















−κ((w2 + ∆w)κ−1 + κθ1((w2 + ∆w + 1)κ−1E1 0
κ(1 − θ2)((w2 + ∆w + 1)κ−1E1 +((w2 + ∆w + 1)κE1 − (w2 + 1)κE2
 
Hence it is suﬃcient to investigate the sign of the determinant of J∆w in
order to assess the relation between prices and states. In the same fashion
we can derive the relation when θ1 and θ2 are bigger than 1
2.







<1       
w2 + ∆w
w2 + ∆w + 1






((w2 + ∆w + 1)
κ E1 − (w2 + 1)
κ E2)
30Table 6: Summary table
This table reports the relation between prices and utility parameters.
γ ∈< 0,1 > γ ∈< 1,∞ >
ψ ∈< 0,1 > ψ ∈< 1,∞ > ψ ∈< 0,1 > ψ ∈< 1,∞ >
Panel A: θ1 = θ2 = 1
2
κ − + + −  
θ1E1 − ¯ E(1−1/κ) 
− − − −1
E1 − E2 + + − −2




   
 
θ1=θ1=0.5
− + − +
Panel B: θ1,θ2 > 1
2
κ − + + −
a1 − + − +
(w2 + ∆w)κ − (w2)κ + + − −









− + − +
1 At θ1 = θ2 = 0.5, w2 = (1 − ¯ E1/κ)−1 ¯ E1/κ, so ¯ E1/κ < 1.
Hence, ¯ E1−1/κ > ¯ E > θ1E1
2γ > 1 ⇐⇒ E2 > E1 since E[Gt+1 | st = 1] > E[Gt+1 | st = 2)]
By noticing that
w2+∆w
w2+∆w+1θ1 (w2 + ∆w + 1)
κ E1 < (w2 + ∆w)κ and that the
term in the last parenthesis can be rewritten as 1
θ1+θ2+1 ((w2 + ∆w)κ − (w2)κ)
we can asses the sign of the determinant via:
J∆w ∝ −κ((w2 + ∆w)
κ − (w2)
κ)
Consulting Table 6 it then follows that our claim is satisﬁed.
31Proof of proposition 4.3. Let us ﬁrst introduce some useful deﬁnitions. Here
and henceforth we deﬁne gt+1 = log
ct+1
ct and ωt+1 = log
1+wt+1
wt .
Using the expression for the stochastic discount factor given by equation
(6), we can apply the Euler equation, Et [Mt+1Rt+1 = 1], to both the return
on the consumption claim, Rc,t+1, and to the return on a risk free claim,
Rb,t+1. Assuming that consumption and asset returns are homoskedastic and
jointly lognormal, we can log-linearize the two Euler equations obtaining
(Rc,t+1) ⇒ 0 = κlog(β) −
κ
ψ


















(Rb,t+1) ⇒ 0 = κlog(β) −
κ
ψ


















Subtracting Equation (20) from Equation (19), we get











Now we can use the deﬁnition of log returns, rc,t+1 = ωt+1 + gt+1, in
order to calculate the second moments in Equation (21). Using the linear












Proposition 4.3 follows after substituting Equation (22) in Equation (21).
32Equation (7): We start from the deﬁnition of stochastic discount factor




















































































From Equation (25) and the deﬁnition of the gross risk free return, Rb,t+1 =
1
Et[Mt+1], Equation (7) follows immediately.
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